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Judicial Review - Professional Association - Inquiry 
into Exclusion from Membership 
Plaintiff, a dentist specializing in orthodontics; applied for 
membership in certain orthodontics associations.• After his applica· 
tion was rejected without reason: plaintiff sought an injunction to 
require defendants to admit him as a member. The lower court 
returned a judgment against plaintiff at the dose of his evidep(;e 
on the basis that, in the absence of showing "economic neccessity" 
for membership, he was not entitled to judicial review of the denial 
of his application.• Held, reversed. Since membership in an ortl:t.o" 
dontics association is a practical necessity for a dentist, a rejected ap- ·· 
plicant has a judicially enforceable right to have his application 
considered in a manner comporting with fundamentals of due prb-
cess, including a showing of cause for rejection. Pinsker v. Pacific 
Coast Society of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 CaL 
Rptr. 623 (1969) .5 
The fundamental legal question presented in Pinsker is 
.whether an individual, by showing that he may be deprived of 
substantial economic advantages by exch1sion from membership " 
in a professional association, can establish a right to judicial inter. 
ven tion with respect to the denial of his application for membership; · ;, 
This question itself poses an interesting dilemma for the judicillr)I 
in jrs attempt to balance and reconcile conflicting group and indfoi. 
1 Orthodontics is that branch of dentistry which deals with irregularitiespf 
the teeth. One who practices OJrthodontics deals predominantly with children, 
Boswell v. Boswell, 280 Ala. 53, 59, 189 So.2d 854, 859 (1966). 
2 The defendants wer-e American Association of Orthodontists (AA,O.), · 
Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (P.C.S.O.), Pacific Coast Society of Qrthci-, 
dontists, Southern CompDnent (P .C.S.O.S.) , and various officers and comiµitt~ 
members of these. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 16(), 
163, 460 P.2d 495, 496, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 n.l (1969). 
" Upon his first application, plaintiff was informed that he was in partner· 
ship with another dentist who was a non-member of the association. After separ:f' 
tion of his patients from those of his pantner, plaintiff was again rejected with~ 
out reason. Id. at 164, 460 P.2d at 497, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 164. . 
• At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, judgment was granted defenqants 
pursuant to § 631.8 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which pr9vide~"' 
that one party may move for a judgment at the close of the opposing parfy'il; 
evidence without waiving his right to offer evidence in defense in the eveilt. th¢ 
motion is not granted. Id. at 166-67, 460 P.2d at 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 627 ... · .. , 
• The lower court's decision in Pinsker was appealed to the California O>un 
of Appeals. The appellate court, however, did not allow defendants to put oii 
evidence in rebuttal. The supreme court held that pursuant to section 6lH.8. of 
the California Code of Oivil Procedure, the situation was as if the motion 
had not been granted, and the defendants had a right to offer their evideµce fi;( 
rebuttal. Id. at 167, 460 P.2d at 500, 81 Cal. Rptl'. at 628. This was a sect$da.tj' 
point in Pinsker, and is not considered in the body of this comment. · 
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dual interests. The scope of this comment will be confined to the 
general approach which has been taken by the judiciary with em-
phasis on the way in which Pinsker is related to other recent decis-
ions. 
It has been established as a general rule in many jurisdictions 
that voluntary associations have unlimited discretion to grant or 
refuse membership, and that courts will not interfere even though 
such an admission is arbitrarily denied." While this rule applies to 
exclusion, it must be noted that there is a distinction between the 
approach taken by courts with respect to exclusion from membership 
and expulsion. Courts have been more prone to grant limited judi-
cial review in cases of expulsion of members, where such expulsion 
has been wrongfully or arbitrarily brought about.' Since the essen-
tial question being treated is an individual's right to membership, 
it would be helpful to look first at the approach that courts have 
taken with respect to expulsion from membership, as distinguished 
from exclusion. 
In granting limited judicial review to expulsion from member-
ship, courts mainly have compelled re~_nstatement on two theories: 
the property doctrine and the contract theory.• The property doc-
trine is based essentially upon the existence of some vested interest 
of the complainant in the assets of the association.• For jurisdic-
tional purposes, courts look to see if there has been a deprivation 
of a property right as a result of the member's expulsion. Sufficient 
property rights have been held to exist in case of an individual's 
"See e.g., Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th 
Cir. 1957) (exclusion from medical association not violation of Sherman Anti-
Trust Act); Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 14 So.2d 225 (1943) 
(failure to issue local charter not violatfon of first or fourteenth amendment); 
Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (1956) (no liability for 
excluding plaintiff from fraternal organfaation); Levy v. United States Grand 
Lodge, J.O.S.B., 9 Misc. 633, 30 N.Y.S. 885- (Sup. Ct. 1894) (refusal to interfere 
with internal questions of benevoJent association in absence of bad faith); Mc-
Kane v. Dem.ocratic Gen. Gomm. 123 N.Y. 609, 25 N.E. 1057 (1890) (court 
refused to enforce right o( a duly elected member of county political committee); 
Kearns v. Howley, 188 Pa. 116, 41 A. 273 (1898) (equity without jurisdiction to 
interfere with the .u::t of political committee); Hartis v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 
(Tex. Civ, App. 1920} (membership in voluntary association is privi1ege which 
may be withheld at pleasure); State ~ rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medi· 
cal Soc'y, 97 W. Va. 273, 124 S.:E. 826 (1924) (individual not entitled to compel 
restoration to medical society when initial ele<;tion was erroneous; see note 31 
infra;. 
See gerierally Annot., 89 A.LR.2d 964 971-80 (1963). 
• Note, Judicial Contrnl of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. R.tw. 
983. 998-1002 (1968). 
• 1 d. at -999. 
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,l i 
right to use the association's physical property'" or a member's 
right to a pro-rata share of the association's assets in event of 
dissolution." On rare occasions even a personal or pecuniary inter-
est has been held sufficient.'~ 
The "contract" theory rests on the idea that the laws of an 
organization constitute a contract between the member and the 
organization." Under this view the courts will look to see if an as-
sociation has acted in accordance with its rules; and also to deter-
mine if those rules violate public palicy.'" 
The application of either of these theories to cases of exclusion 
from membership is obviously inadequate. The "propertf' doctrine 
cannot be applied by a non-member since he has yet to gain a 
property interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the association's assets. 
The "contract" theory is likewise inapplicable since no contractual 
right has arisen between the prospective member and the associa-
tion_ In any case, basing judicial intervention on the supposed exis-
tence of some contractual right is largely an illusory use of 
rhetoric. In cases where judicial intervention has been justified on 
this basis, it very easily could be justified on another more appro-
priate and sounder basis.'" Yet if a court is committed to the "con-
'"Davis v. Scher, 356 Mich. 291, <:Y7 N.W.2d 137 (1959); Hawkins v. Obrem· 
ski, 227 N.Y. S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1%2); Heaton v. Hnl1, .51 App. Div. 126, 64 
N.Y.S. 279 (Sup. Gt. 1900). 
u Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y S. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1904). 
,.. See Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. App. 1947); (personal right of 
membership, humiliation and injury to feelings due to expulsion) ; Joseph v. 
Passaic Hosp. Ass'n, 38 NJ. Super. 284, ll8 A.2d 696 (1955) (right to earn a 
livelihood); Bax;r v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N·J.Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (I89'1:) 
(right to practic7 _profession). . . . . 
"'Note, Jtulzcial Control of Actwm of Private Associations, 76 HAitv. L. 
REV. 983, 1001 (1963) . 
:>< Id. See Parsons v. North Cent. Ass'n., 271 F_ Supp. 65 (N.D., III. 1967); 
Irwin v, Lorio, 169 La. 1090, 126 So __ 600 (1930).;J Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff 
County Medical Soc'y, 133 Neb. 814, 277 N.W. 378 (1938). 
While judicial intervention has rested primarily upon the "contract" or 
"property" theories, other cases have held that there is a judicial remedy 
wlthout specifically relying U!)Oil such theoretical application. See Bernstein v. 
A!ameda-Colllira Costa Medical Ass.'n, 139 CaJ. App. 2d 241, 293 P.2d 862 (195~ ; 
Smith v. Kern County Mediral Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P .2d 874 {194-2): Reid v. 
Medical Soc'y, 156 N.Y.S. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915) 1;- Brown v. Harris County Medical 
Soc'y, 194 S.W. 1179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See also 41 MINN, L. REV. 212 (1957); 
5 UTAH L. Rl!:v. 270 (1956) -
1
~ It would seem that the application of set rules in these cases for the 
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction, while lending itself to stability in the law, 
will not always produoe a desirable ttSult. Courts might reach a fairer result in 
a higher percentage of cases if they would sacrifice s.tab/i.Uty and look to the 
partirular individuals, the particular organizations, and the particular facts 
unique to each. case. This in essence is what the court did in Pinsker. 
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tract" theory, judicial concern may be precluded because the 
association's rules have been compiled with,'" or lead to situations 
where a court would require strict compliance with an association's 
rules even though other factors would point to judicial abstention." 
It readily can be seen that, whether applied to expulsion or 
exclusion, rigid adherence to some judicial doctrine such as the 
"property" or "contract" doctrine in many instances does not reach 
the desired result. In recognizing this problem, several courts have 
indicated an increased sensitivity to the roles that professional 
associations play in our society and the effect of denial of member-
ship upon an individual. While these associations are normally vol-
untary,'" membership in a particular association is often essential 
for one to conduct his trade or profession effectively. The control 
exercised by such groups over the affairs of a particular profession 
may make membership in these groups the only practical means of 
influencing one's working environment ... Thus, in placing more 
emphasis on the aspect of control exercised by voluntary associa-
tions, a number of courts have departed from adherence to old 
rules and have looked more to the particular facts of each case. 
Through these cases there appears to be a realization of the signifi-
cant role these organizations play, and looking at the facts of each 
case, courts have taken into consideration the nature of that role, 
the appropriateness of particular actions and policies to that role 
and the interests of affected individua]s and the public at large ... 
Due to this increased emphasis on the interests of the indivi-
dual and on public policy, the differences between cases of ex-
pulsion and exclusion, while still important, have diminished in 
significance. The first indication of departure from judicial ab-
'"~See, e,g.~ West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Lewis, 17 Misc. 2d 94, 191 
N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
" Th1;1 "contract" theory has been critici:t.ed by several legal writers. See 
Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HMtv; L. REV. 
993 (1930) ; Note, Judicial Control of Acti= of Private AssociatiD?'ls 76 HARV. 
L. REV, 983, 1002 (1963); Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Yolun· 
tary Associatiorns, 65 YAIJ!. L.J. 369 (1956); 5 UTAH L. R.F.v. 270 (1956). 
"'The involuntary aspect of these organizations has been recognized in some 
cases and articles. See, e.g., Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical 
Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d, 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1952). See alsa Ghafee, Supra Note 17. 
19 For an interesting discussion of these factors see Tobriner and Grodin, 
The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Iridustrial State, 
55 CALIF. L. REV, 1247, 1254-55 (1967). 
20 Id. at 1262-63. 
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stention appeared in litigation involving labor unions," but it was· 
not until the decision in Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical 
Society,"' that this increased sensitivity was reflected in cases invol. 
ving professional associations. In Falcone, the plaintiff was denied 
membership in the county medical society because he did not spend 
four years at an AM.A. approved school. He had received a D.O. 
degree from the Philadelphia College of Osteopathy,"" and subse-
quently obtained an M.D. degree. The lower court held that: 
where an organization is in fact involuntary and/or is of 
such a nature that the court should intervene to protect 
the public, and where an exclusion results in a substantial 
injury to a plaintiff, the court will grant relief, providing 
that such exclusion was contrary to the organization's own 
laws ... or the application of a particular law or laws of an 
organization was contrary t.o public policy. _It follows that 
each case must stand upon its own facts." 
The court concluded that the me~ical society had virtual monopol-
istic control over the practice of medicine in that locality, and that 
because of denying plaintiff membership, he was unable to use 
hospital facilities. By virtue of this exclusion from membership, 
the plaintiff was held to have suffered substantial injury. 
In Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Society,"' the court re-
lied heavily on the Falcone decision. In agreeing with that decision 
"' For a discussion of the trend away from judicial abstention involving labor 
unions see Summers, Union Powers and Workers Rights, 49 MICH. L REv. 805 
(1951) . 
.. 34 N.J. 582; 170 A.2d 791 (1961), atrg, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 
324 (Sup. Ct. 1960) One early case often cited as evidence of judicial review in 
cases of exclusion is Hillery v. Pedic Soc'y, 189 App. Div. 766, 179 N.Y.S. 62 
(Sup. Gt. 1919). In that case plaintiff, a Negro, was duly elected to membership. 
Subsequently, the society changed its by-laws in order to make its entrance 
requirem·ent.s more stringent. The court held that the revision of the by-laws, 
as applied to the plaintiff, was a nullity and that he was duly elected and still 
a member . 
.. Osteopathy is the system of medical practice based on the theory that 
diseases are due chiefly to a loss of structural integrity in the tissues and that 
the body is capable of making its own remedies against disease and other 
toxic conditions when it is in normal structural relationship. It utilizes gener-
ally accepted physical, medicinal, and surgical methods of diagnosi.'l and therapy . 
. Falcone v. Middlesex. County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 586, 170 A.2d 791, 794; 
n.2 1961), affg 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960). This theory is not gen· 
erally accepted by many in the medical profession, and recognition of osteopaths 
as regular physicians has often been withheld. 34 N.f 582, 585, 170 A.2d 791, 793, 
n.l (1961), aff'g 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960). 
"'62 N.J. Super. 184, 197, 162 A.2d 324, 331 (1960), affd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d. 
791 JI961). · 
96 Ariz. 240, 393 P 2d 926 (1964). 
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and allowing a mandamus proceeding against defendants,"" the court 
stated that while private groups should have the right to deter-
mine their own membership, this right does not extend to situations 
where a medical society exercises control over a doctor's access to 
hospital facilities as in Falcone. "[T]he society's exercise of a quasi-
governmental power is the legitimate object of judicial concern.""' 
The Pinsker decision, read in conjunction with Falcone and 
Blende, manifests this rather recent evolution of judicial concern 
over the increasing power of professional associations. In Pinsker 
the court steered away from the requirement of showing an economic 
necessity for membership. Since the associations exercise extensive 
control over the specialty of orthodontics, membership in the de-
fendant asssociations becomes a practical necessity. This is not 
to say that the plaintiff would not have been able to be reasonably 
successful in the practice of orthodontics without being a mem her 
in the associations. However, he -suffered a loss of substantial econ-
omic advantages and damages to his reputation by being denied 
membership. Thus, although in the past courts have sometimes dis-
tinguished between economic advantages and economic necessity, 
the court in Pinsker did not do so. Probably the basic direction of 
the Pinsker decision, however, concerns its emphasis on public policy 
as a factor to be considered. In its opinion, the court stated that:" 
Defendant associations hold themselves out to the public 
and the dental profession generally as the sole organiza-
tions recognized by the ADA, which is itsell a virtual mon-
opoly, to determine standards, both ethical and education-
al, for the practice and certification of orthodontics. Thus, 
a public interest is shown,- and the associations must be 
viewed as having a fiduciary responsibility with respect 
to the acceptance or rejection of membership application. 
In recent cases where membership has been compelled, parti-
cularly those cases remanded for further proceedings, public polity 
reasons largely have been responsible for the departure from the 
general rule of the past. Allegedly voluntary associations have 
taken on many aspects of involuntariness in view of the tremendous 
economic and political power which they possess. They are no 
"''I'he court m Bleride, while not compelling admi.<sion to membership, did 
.allow a mandamus proceeding requiring the lower court to hear the case in 
accordance with the opinion. Jd. at -, 393 P .2d at 930. 
"'Id. at -, 393 P .2d at 929. 
"'Pinsker v. Pacific Coast SOc'y of· Orthodontists, l cal. 3d 160, 166, 460 
P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, ff1:1 (1969). 
6
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longer merely involved with areas which are solely private concerns. 
They effect the public at large, and they also have an impact on 
many indhriduals who are non-members but have sufficient rela-
tionships with these organizations to be substantially affected by 
their actions. The public responsibility which has devolved upon 
these organizations is obvious. This idea is perhaps best reflected 
by the lower court in Falcone, where it stated: "The monopolistic 
control ... of the practice of medicine ... necessarily catties with 
it certain public responsibilities. It may not escape these responsi-
bilities by designating itself as a private, voluntary association.'' .. 
It should be cautioned that while emphasis has been placed up; 
on recent decisions which have departed from the general rule, 
there are still a substantial number of jurisdictions, including 
West Virginia,"" which either still adhere to judicial abstention or 
which have not had a recent opportunity to decide such a case. It 
should also be empl).asized that judicial inquiry into exclusion from 
membership has been confined to those voluntary association$ 
such as professional associations herein discussed, and has not been 
extended to social dubs, religious organizations and fraternal associa-
"'Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 199, 1§2 
A.2d 324, 332 (1960), aft'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961). . . 
.. The case of State ex rel. Hartigan v. Monongalia County Medical Soc'y, !l'7 
w. Va. 273, 124 S.E. 826 (1924) , has been frequently cited in support of the 
general rule that vo)untary associations have an :in.limited. right_ to. det_erutine 
thei.r own membership. The only other West Virgm~a case m pomt is Snnp5911 
v. Grand Int'd Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'r. 83 W. Va. 355, 98 S..E. 580 (191m; 
cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919). While not directly concerned with exclUSi<>Il 
or expulsion lirom a professional association, the more recent case of State ex rel, 
Bmnaugh v. Parkersburg, 148 W. Va. 568, 136 Si.E.2d 183 (1964), gives an: indica:• 
tion that the West Virginia court might consider requiring reinstatement of a 
member of an organization if he was unjustly expelled. In Brana.ugh a regul:irty 
licensed physician and su,rgeon was suspended from the st,tl'f of a pul>Iii'; 
· hospital with no reason given for his suspension. While it was emphasized tha.t 
private hospitals have the right to exclude physicians, the court held this d<>¢$ 
not apply to public hospitals, so long as the physician COllfomJii to all ~-
able rules and regulations. Id. at 572, 136 S.E.2d at 786. In reflecting it~ 
awareness of the role such organizations play, the court stated: 
A physician or surgeon who is not permitted to practire his profession 
in a hospital is, as a practical matter, denied the right to fully practice 
his profession. Much of what a physician or surgeon must do in this 
day of advanced medical technology can be done only in a hospital. 
... Although one's right to practice medicine is not absolute and uniquali-
fied, it is a valuable franchise afforded to one properly trained which 
should be :reasonably protected. , 
Id. at 575, 136 S.E.2d at '187. (on the other hand), while it is clear the W~i 
Virginia court will not hesitate to inter.rere in areas directly concerned with 
the public interest, it is still not certain that it would judicially enforce one's 
right to membership in a professional organization. 
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tions which ate primarily pervaded by intimate social relationships"' 
The external impact of exclusion from these organizations is largely 
confined to exclusion of persons from sharing in these relationships, 
traditionally a matter of only private concern. 
It would appear, however, that the judicial trend with regard 
to the problem of exclusion from membership is to view the facts 
of each case individually, concentrating on the type of organization 
and its purpose, the extent of control which it exercises and the 
efffect on other individuals and the public. 
Charles Blaine Myers, Jr. 
31 Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 
Cal. R.ptr. 808 (1965), cert. denied; !184 U.S. 905 (1966); Kurk v. Medical Soc.'y, 
260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Note, Judicially Compelled Admission to 
Medieal Societies, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1186 (1962}. 
Statutes - Vagueness of Phrase "Contributing to 
Delinquency of a _Minor" 
The defendant, Ralph Hodges, was convicted of contributing 
to .the delinquency of a minor in the state of Oregon. He appealed 
his conviction, contending that the statute under which he was 
indicted violated the due. process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Held, reversed and remanded. The statute was unconstitution-
ally vague and thus did not give, adequate notice of what conduct 
was proscribed and consequently the judge and jury were allowed 
so much leeway in its application that the law-making (legislative) 
function was effectively delegated to them. State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d 
491 (Ore. 1969) . 
The challenged section of the Oregon statute stated that "any 
person who does any act which manifestly tends to cause any child 
to become a delinquent child shall be punished upon conviction. . 
."' "Delinquent child" is defined in a separate section -of the 
1 When, a child is a delinquent child as defined by any statute of this 
state, any person responsible for, or by any act encouraging, causing 
or contributing to the delinquency of such a child, or any person who 
by threats, coJILlllllnd or persuasion, endeavors to induce any child to per· 
form any act or follow any course of conduct which would ca.use it to 
become a delinquent child, or any person who does any act which 
manifestly tends to cause any child to become a delinquent child, 
shall be punished upon conviction by a fine of not more than $1,000, 
or by imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one 
year or both, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period not 
exceeding five years. 
ORE REv. SrAT. § 167.210 (1967). 
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